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FRANCHISE, EQUALITY AND TURNOUT:
PROBLEMS OF ANALYSIS
It is known that the development of political rights, and in particular those
of voting, was the end result of a long historical process going back to the 18th
century and was rooted in the development of civic rights. Civic rights developed
primarily in relation to the market as rights of property, of contract, of free
residence and work-place choice, etc. Civic rights also refer to the potential for
associability in a society when they touch upon freedom of faith, thought, speech,
assembly and association. The combination of these civic rights constitutes the
point of departure for the opening of a political public space and opinion. The
successive development of strictly political rights adds the decisive push for
political mobilisation, granting the actual legal basis for the development of
interest groups and political parties1.
However, the process of development of political rights, and in particular of
voting rights, should not be seen as a linear development of previous and
prerequisite rights of expression, association and opposition. Even in the second
half of the 19th century the combination was rather complex. We find cases of
extended voting rights not accompanied by firmly established association and
expression rights, as well as the reverse. This is in part due to the ambiguous role
the process of enfranchisement played in the eyes of the ruling elites. Indeed,
from a broad historical perspective from 1848 to the First World War, the level of
suffrage granted indicated two quite different situations: suffrage as a device of
national integration and suffrage as a device of political representation. In the first
case, large levels of franchise were granted from above as an instrument for
nationally integrating social groups, but was blocked as an instrument of
representation by a vast set of inequality devices from the curia/estate system to
plural voting or institutional barriers, from irresponsible government to second
chamber predominance etc. Such institutional devices actually prevented the
suffrage from performing the role of properly representing electors and granting
them a share of parliamentary decisional power. On the other side, and contrary
to integration suffrage, restricted or enlarged representational suffrage is based
and impinges upon already established opposition and associational rights and
constitutes their representational expression. The nature of the suffrage is
therefore characterised through ‘other aspects’ different from the suffrage itself
that clarify its role and function within the political system.
In this paper I will leave aside this political meaning of suffrage as a
discussion of it requires a parallel analysis of the liberalisation and
democratisation of the political system. I will concentrate my attention on the
descriptive comparative analysis of
1) the levels of electorate enfranchisement across European countries;
2) the institutional mechanisms of inequality;
3) the levels of turnout, i.e. the extent to which the enfranchised electorate
actually participated in the voting.
Franchise, equality and participation are therefore the three main
dimensions along which I will try to classify European experiences. Let us see
which problems this exercise needs to face.
Even the simplest analysis of levels of enfranchisement presents important
problems if one wants it to be comparative and systematic2. First of all, the
process is not uni-dimensional as franchise development tends to take France
and Great Britain as two extremes and opposite examples. On one side the
British model is characterised by slow enlargement, proceeding step by step and
deprived of cases of reversal of the tendency, but at the same the term
‘development of franchise’ would lead to believe. The standard treatment of time
characterised by long periods of formal recognition of profound inequalities. On
the other side there is the French model, with its universal male direct suffrage
proclaimed and written down for the first time in 1793 but never implemented and
reintroduced by a decree of the Provisional Government on 5th March 1848. The
French pattern is regarded as the prototype of the early and sudden enlargement,
but is characterised by frequent reversals and by a tendency toward plebiscitarian
manipulation of mass support.  The distinction between these two extreme
models indicates that it is difficult to find a common dimension along which to
rank-order national cases. We may distinguish an early versus late dimension; a
sudden versus gradual dimension, and a continuity dimension (with or without
important reversals).
Sheer levels of franchise must be weighted with questions of equality.
Obviously, the inequalities pertaining to the existence of curia/estate systems or
to others forms of plural voting should be taken into consideration. The violation
of the “one man-one vote” principle must be incorporated into the analysis of
franchise to avoid drawing false inferences from sheer levels of enfranchised
population.
Finally, the third problem in the comparative assessment of the
development of the franchise relates to the actual levels of participation, in other
words to the turnout. The franchise defines a legal electorate as a set of
individuals having the right to take part in elections. However, several other
factors played an important role in determining the extent to which this formal
right was actually exercised. It will therefore be crucial to investigate the
relationship between electorate and turnout in comparative terms to assess to
what extent potentially similar electorates were actually resulting in similar levels
of vote. This again is a crucial aspect in relation to the development of the
electoral force of the left.
A final issue in the comparative analysis of the early enfranchisement -
legal and actual- is related to the data. We have a rich variety of estimates of
enfranchised people in historical sources, but there is very little systematic
standardisation of these data, which makes cross-country comparisons highly
unreliable. The electorate is sometimes calculated in percentage of the total or
male population; sometimes in percentage of the ‘adult’ (male or total) population
and the latter is defined by the legal standard of the country for adulthood or by
the age indicated in the different laws: 30, 27, 24 or later 21 and 18 year old
people (sometimes independent and generally higher than the legal adulthood for
civic rights as the voting right was regarded as an especially demanding activity).
Sometimes figures may be offered as percentage of the enfranchised age group,
that is of the population above the legal age indicated by the electoral law.
All this makes a rigorous comparison across time and space very difficult
indeed. For this purpose we need a single measure which takes the number of
people having legal right to vote in percentage of some entity which is relatively
stable and homogeneous over time and across country3. For all these reasons
we have used a single international source which offers the figure of the
electorate as a percentage of the total population (male and female) being 20 or
older4. All the data concerning the electorate in the group of our elections do take
such a population as their reference point. This solution offers clear advantages.
Whatever the legal voting age defined by the various laws, whether the suffrage
was only male or a mix of male and female or universal, we always have a similar
cross-country and cross-space reference point to evaluate how large the
enfranchised section of the population was. This measure raises problems only
when the voting age is lower than 20, which can result in electorates being higher
than 100 percent. However, this problem emerges only in the 1970s, in a phase
of well established universal suffrages (except Switzerland) and in which,
anyway, the analysis of the electorate loses its importance given the uniformly
high levels.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN ELECTORATE
In sheer quantitative terms, how many individuals were allowed to vote
during the 19th century? In Table 1 I have tried to systematise the figures
concerning this process. This table is divided into four parts corresponding to the
period up to 1880, 1881-1917, 1918-1944 and 1945-1975.
Even a cursory look at the data in Table 1 shows that the earliness of
enfranchisement depends to a large extent on the period we take into account. If
we start by considering the 1848-1880 period, three countries stand out as the
very early comers to relatively large suffrages. France, after experimentation with
several formulae in the post Napoleonic period from 1815 to 18465, suddenly
introduced in 1848 universal (it was already equal since 1831) male suffrage for
citizens over 21 years, with a remarkable jump from about 1-2% of the electorate
to 36%. Switzerland fundamentally did the same. Universal male suffrage for
citizens of 20 years or above was introduced with the constitutional reform which
followed the Sonderbund of the autumn of 1847, but its precedents were of a
different sort. Switzerland had never really known any régime censitaire and had
a long tradition of general voting in the mountain cantons. However, electoral
inequalities were obtained through the electoral privileges of the cities (of the
plateau) against which had been directed the 1830 and 1833 ‘revolutions’ which
had enlarged and equalised the suffrage6. So, in the Swiss case, the jump is the
same and at the same date as in France, but there was less of a break with the
past. There are estimates which indicate at about 30% the enfranchised
electorate in 1848. Finally Denmark too introduced equal male suffrage in the
wake of the 1848 revolution, which produced a radical jump from autocracy to
proto-democracy in the Kingdom. The principle, however, was tempered by a
great deal more restrictions than in the other two cases7 and was applied to men
over 30. This resulted in an enfranchised electorate smaller than in the other two
cases, at about 25%.
The fourth early comer to high levels of male suffrage was Germany.
Before 1867 Germany was of course not a unified country and no Reichstag
existed. However the short lived Frankfurt Assembly of 1848 was elected by
universal male suffrage. After that date many German states had a fairly large
male electorate. In particular in the primary elections in the Kingdom of Prussia,
even if the suffrage was not only indirect, but also unbearably unequal8, every
male citizen of 24 years or more was entitled to cast a vote9. The two elections
held in 1867 for the Reichstag of the North Confederation were universal male
(25 or more years) suffrage elections, and the electorate has been estimated at
about 35% of the adult population. After the foundation of the Reich all elections
after 1871 were direct, equal and male universal. So, even if official data
concerning Germany start twenty years later than 1848, one can safely argue that
male universal suffrage of some sort had already been practised since that date.
Beyond these clear four early-comers, all other countries had very
restrictive suffrage requirements in the middle of the 19th century, with
electorates ranging between 3 and 8 percent of the 20 year or older population
and there is not much purpose in distinguishing between them. A case possibly to
be singled out is Norway. The 1814 Norwegian constitution introduced what
Rokkan regards as the most liberal voting qualifications of the time, estimating
that it enfranchised 25% of all men10. This corresponded to roughly 10% of the
population of 20 or more which was indeed up to 1848 the highest franchise in
Western European countries. However, 1848 passed unnoticed in Norway and
the electorate stayed stable around 9% or even declined to 8% in the 1870s so
that by that time the Norwegian franchise could not be regarded as high in
comparative terms.
If we move to the end of this first period, in the 1870-80s, the situation is
substantially unmodified. There are only three cases worth mentioning from our
point of view. Next to the French, German, Danish and Swiss forerunners, come
Austria, Sweden and the United Kingdom as the only three countries where the
electorate had bypassed the threshold of 10%. All the others remained at the low
levels mentioned before. In Austria the first direct elections to the lower house
were held in 1873 (in previous elections the deputies were indirectly elected by
Provincial Diets), with an enfranchised electorate of about 10%11. Similarly in
Sweden, the establishment of a second chamber and of centrally recorded
elections came after 1866 and through the 1870s the electorate ranged around
10%. Finally in Britain, the electoral reforms of the 1867-1872 period brought the
electorate12 to about 15% of the population of 20 or more, which at that time was
the highest franchise after the four forerunners to universal or quasi-universal
male suffrage.
In short, at the beginning of the 1880s, the order of suffrage extension saw
France, Switzerland, Germany and Denmark as clearly, the forerunners. Britain
was the second largest electorate after them, and Austrian, Norway and Sweden
were following close with roughly are adult in ten being enfranchised.
The 1880-1920 period is the crucial phase of suffrage extension. Not
surprisingly, in this period the electorate of the forerunners remained substantially
unchanged in France, Germany and Switzerland, while it increased only very
slowly and marginally in Denmark, passing from about 27% in 1881 to 30% in
1913. The other 9 countries followed different paths. The first to get substantial
electoral enlargements were Ireland and the United Kingdom with the reforms in
the middle of the 1880s that introduced a uniform household franchise, a uniform
lodger franchise and a uniform £ 10 occupation franchise in every borough and
county throughout the country, while leaving ownership franchise differentiated.
The electorate was increased by 80% through these measures and reached the
level of about 30% of the adult population13.
Three other countries enlarged the electorate to reach a third of the adult
population, corresponding roughly to universal male suffrage, before the turn of
the century: Belgium (1894 first election), Austria (1896) and Norway (1900). The
Belgian 1893 reform suddenly increased tenfold what was probably the most
restricted suffrage in Europe at that time (excluding Finland for which no reliable
figures have been found): from 3.9% in 1892 to 37.3% in the 1894 election.
Universal male suffrage was introduced for the National assembly for male
citizens of 25 or more years, even if (see later) crying inequalities were
maintained.
Austria is a more difficult case to analyse given that elections to the lower
House (the Abgeordnetenhaus) continued to be held according to a curia system
that divided the House into 4 classes: the first (85 seats) made up by male big
landowners who paid at least 50 florins of taxes per year; the second (21 seats)
by members of the Chambers of Commerce and Trade; the third (118 seats) for
all male urban dwellers of 24 years or more who paid 10 Florins or more, and the
fourth (129 seats indirectly elected) by male rural commune residents who paid at
least 10 florins. Apart from considerations concerning inequalities (see later), the
total electorate estimated to be enfranchised under this system was about 12-
13% in the 1890s. The 1896 reform however, added a fifth curia to the fourth (72
seats compared with the 353 deputies for the other four) which had a generalized
character and universal suffrage for men. This brought the enfranchised
population to about 36% of the adult population (see Legend in Table 1).
Finally, in Norway suffrage grew slowly from the 10% that had
characterised 19th century elections to 16-17% at the end of the century by
gradual reform which extended suffrage from the property and occupational
requirements to citizens paying a minimum tax on income (1885). Finally in 1898
(first election 1900) universal suffrage for men of 25 or more was achieved
bringing the electorate to about 35%14. What is interesting about Norway is that
throughout this period the electorate continued to grow by a marginal increase
linked to progressive enlargements: in 1907 a proportion of the female electorate
(about 48%) was enfranchised (those with a certain income); in 1913 universal
suffrage for adult women was introduced (it had been preceded by women’s
universal suffrage at the local level in 1911) bringing the enfranchised adult
population to 77%, the second highest level of enfranchisement in Europe at that
time after the Finnish (see below). Even after that, the electorate continued its
progressive growth until the 1930s by the minor incorporation of other sections of
the population. Overall, the Norwegian pattern of extension was extremely
gradual and progressive.
Finland represents the unique case of a relatively late and extremely
sudden male universal suffrage (but early female). Between 1809 and 1867, a
four Diet system gave representation to noble heads of families, the clergy, city
dwellers (1-2 representatives for each town or group of towns), and to peasants
(one representative by jurisdictional district). From 1872 to 1904, elections and
meetings of the Diets become more regular (1869 Diet Act), but procedures and
qualifications for voting did not change fundamentally except for allowing school
and university teachers and civil servants to vote in the clergy curia. The
franchise was therefore extremely restricted in this period even if I have been
unable to find estimates of it. In 1904, still within the estate system, an increase of
the electorate brought the enfranchised adult population to about 9%. The 1906
reform, following the temporary loosening of the Russian hold on Finnish political
affairs, introduced suddenly universal male and female (over 24 years) suffrage,
direct and secret elections and even proportional representation. In a single and
relatively unopposed reform, the Finnish new unicameral Parliament (Eduskunta)
was elected by 76% of the adult electorate: from being the most restricted
suffrage in Europe at the beginning of the century, Finland passed to the largest
electorate in only one year and one reform.
The countries that arrived last to universal male suffrage were the
Netherlands, Italy and Sweden. Yet there are important differences even in this
relatively homogeneous group. Italy had the largest electorate of the three in the
1880s and at the beginning of the 1890s, but its mean level of about 15% was
kept constant until the reform of 1913. In Fact the Zanardelli Reform Act of 1882
had significantly increased the electorate to about 13%, lowering the male voting
age from 25 to 21, by reducing the tax minima and equivalent wealth requirement
and educational qualifications. Actually, the increase in suffrage was largely due
to this latter element. Before the Zanardelli reform, 80% of those incorporated in
the electorate were there thanks to tax and property qualifications; after the
reform this percentage dropped to 34.7%, while 63.5% were inscribed thanks to
intellectual and educational capacities15. However, in the period of anti-socialist
legislation starting in 1894, electoral registers were revised and educational tests
were made more stringent with the actual result of disenfranchising almost 5% of
the adult population. The electorate fell back to pre-1880 levels and grew slowly
in following years, again reaching 15% of the adult population on the eve on the
1912 electoral reform (first election 1913) that introduced almost universal male
suffrage (males over 30) brought the electorate to 42% of the adult population16.
The number of electors suddenly passed from 2.930.000 to 8.443.000 with an
average increase of 251%.
Strangely as it might look, as the two countries have never been
associated in this way, the Swedish pattern of franchise development closely
follows the Italian one. Although no experience of marked disenfranchisement
occurred in Sweden in the 1890s, the electorate remained throughout the 1880s
and 1890s fairly stable at around 10% of the adult population and rose to about
15% in the first decade of the century. In 1909, only a couple of years before Italy,
almost universal male suffrage for citizens of 24 years and over was introduced,
with an electorate that doubled from 15.8 to 32.8%.
The Netherlands belongs to this group of late-comers to universal male
suffrage. However, its pattern differs from those of Italy and Sweden as the first
steps of the enlargements came earlier and the whole process was more gradual.
The first reform of the 1880s (1887) doubled the electorate from 5.7% -probably
the second lowest electorate of the 1880s after Belgium- to almost 12 % of the
adult population through a lowering of economic requirements. A second doubling
of the electorate from 11 to 20% took place with the reform of 1896 (first election
1897). This reform, although not introducing universal suffrage, brought the male
electorate to a level which meant the enfranchisement of many highly qualified
workers, large parts of the lower middle classes and sections of the rural
proletariat, and small farmers and tenants. Universal male suffrage was only
introduced after Word War I in 1918, but the jump in the electorate (to 39.3%)
was relatively minor as the electorate had already grown to almost 28% of the
adult population in the last pre-war election (1913): an increase of about 11%.
The final stage of enfranchisement concerned of course the female
electorate and in this case the sequence of countries is far easier to describe as
in most cases it was a sudden, final decision. Only two countries had
enfranchised women before Word War I: Finland in 1907 together with males;
and Norway between 1909 (for women whose own or husband’s income
exceeded a minimum) and 1915. In Austria, Denmark (29 or over), and Germany,
female enfranchisement took place in a single step immediately after the war,
between 1918 and 1919. The United Kingdom and Ireland enfranchised women
of 30 years or more (with certain minimal limitations) in 1918 and completed the
process in 1923 in Ireland, and in 1928 in The United Kingdom. In both cases, the
age limit was brought down to 21 years, as for the men. The Netherlands and
Sweden enlarged the suffrage to women at the beginning of the 1920s:
respectively 1922 and 1921. Finally Italy, France and Belgium did this only in the
aftermath of Word War II, between 1945 and 1948. Well behind, as is known, was
Switzerland which gave the suffrage to women at the national level only in 1971,
one hundred twenty three years after the same right was granted to men.
This rapid comment on the data illustrated in Table 1 shows that a simple
and straightforward classification of national experiences is difficult even along a
single dimension like earliness/ lateness. Beyond the four clear cut cases of
France, Germany, Switzerland and Denmark, the relative position of the other
countries has kept changing from decade to decade even if we limit the analysis
to the male enfranchisement. In Table 2 I have produced a rank-ordering of the
countries according to the average level of franchise they had reached in each
decade since the 1860s. This Table clarifies how difficult it is to characterise the
experience of a country over the whole period of mass politics development. In
fact, relative positions change quite a lot from decade to decade, and make
difficult a general appreciation. So, Switzerland and France which were leading
up to the 1860s had fallen in the group of the lowest level by the 1920s;
Denmark’s early start was followed by a stagnation which allowed several
countries to catch up with Denmark by the 1870s and 1880s. Germany is
probably the only country which consistently keeps itself in the first ranks
throughout time. The relative inconsistency in the ranking of countries over time
makes clear how difficult it is to generalise about earliness of the suffrage,
beyond the simple identification of the early comers.
THE TEMPO OF ENFRANCHISEMENT
We need to qualify our analysis of the timing with supplementary
considerations relating to the tempo, i.e. to the rapidity or slowness with which the
suffrage was extended. Taking into consideration the tempo of enfranchising
complicates considerably the picture, but it is important not only for descriptive
purposes, but also in order to clarify more precisely whether similar levels at a
given time were the result of gradual growth of the electorate or of sudden
expansions of it. Moreover, the timing also has important implications for the
theory of political development and institutional integration. Patterns of political
development, and in particular issues of regime stability and institutionalisation,
are in fact frequently related to different modalities of enlargement, arguing that
sudden increases in franchise exposed the democratising regimes to more
pronounced strains than was the case in those with a more gradual development.
Moreover, even the issue of party formation and organisational development is
linked to the existence, timing and magnitude of major jumps in electorates.
Parties developing before or after the major jumps in franchise are often thought
to adopt ideological and organisational feature which are distinctively different. It
is therefore important to be able to assess comparatively the tempo of
enfranchisement in order to be able to properly relate it to other politico-
institutional developments.
Even in this case, the analysis is not so straightforward as one might think.
To help the reader to follow the discussion I have reproduced in graphical form for
each country the development of the electorate over time. These figures (Figure 1
a to o) are reported in the Appendix of this paper. In them, next to the line of the
development of the electorate, there is also the line (dotted line) of the
development of the turnout over time (the percentages of valid votes
(occasionally only total votes were available) over the electorate. Turnout levels
will be discussed later. For the moment let us concentrate on the sudden versus
gradual nature of the electorate’s development (see Figure 1 a-o).
Looking closely at the line of the Electorate for each country it is evident
that in the vast majority of cases the enlargements of the suffrage proceeded in
relatively large jumps. Graduality in a real sense is not the case of any of the
considered countries. First of all, sudden and big changes are always the case for
female enfranchisement; in all cases but three this change occurred with a single
big jump clearly doubling the electorate. Only in Norway, Ireland and the United
Kingdom did the female enfranchisement proceed in two but almost consecutive
steps: 1909-1915; 1918-1923 and 1918-1929 (I refer, as usual, to first elections
under new rule). Male development was of course more differentiated, but also in
this case jumps predominate over gradual evolution. Let us define a jump as an
increase of more than 10% of the electorate. We see that in no country -excluding
the four early-omers- is there absent a jump of at least this magnitude. Looking at
Figure 1 c,e,f and shows that for these early-comers one should not speak of
growth but simply of stability. France, Germany, Switzerland and Denmark
suddenly brought their electorate to an almost universal male level very early and
afterwards it remained at the same level until after W.W.I, when it was enlarged to
females. These are therefore special cases of early and sudden enfranchisement
followed by an extremely long period (about 70 years at least) of constant and
unchanged levels. Early-comers could not have gradual development so that the
category of very early and gradual enlargement is as unthinkable at that of very
late and gradual. All the other cases were characterised by more or less big
jumps. Going from the earlier jumps to the later, the cases are the following:
United Kingdom produced the first important jump of about 13 percentage points
already in 1885; and again of about 13 points in 1918; Ireland jumped by 18-19
percentage points at the same time; Belgium by 33.4 points in 1894; Austria
jumped by 22 percentage points in 1896; Norway by 18.2 percentage points in
1900; Finland by almost 30 points in 1907; Sweden by 16.7 points in 1911; Italy
by 27.2 points in 1913; Netherlands by almost 12 percentage points in 1918.
Biggest and most frequents jumps occurred before W.W.I and not in its aftermath
(only in the Netherlands).
The magnitude of these changes varied. The most sudden increases, in
the order of a third of the adult population, were no doubt experienced by Belgium
at a very early stage and by Finland and Italy later. Austria had a sudden increase
concerning about a fifth of the adult population in 1896. Ireland 1886, Norway
1900 and Sweden 1911 had smaller jumps, at around 18% of the adult
population, and finally the Netherlands had only one jump very late after W.W.I
and also the smallest in magnitude; just above the 10% limits, like the two British
increases. All the other changes not mentioned here can be safely considered as
gradual adaptations due to small modifications in economic and/or capacity
requirements and in revisions of the electoral lists.
Looking at major jumps in enfranchisement is only one of the possible
ways to evaluate the graduality of the suffrage extension in the crucial phase of
mass politics development. We can control the provisional groupings identified in
this way by calculating the average yearly increase in the electorate for each
decade in the crucial period between the 1860s and the 1920s. In Table 3 these
figures are reproduced. I have proceeded considering only male suffrage in order
to avoid overemphasising change for those countries which were the first to
enfranchise women. I have taken the election nearest to the beginning of the
decade and that nearest to the end of it, computed the electorate differential and
divided it by the standard figure of 10 (years). Countries in this case are
regrouped according to the tentative classification made on the bases of the
major increases.
Looking at Table 3 we get more confident in our tentative ordering of
countries. The Table offers at the same time information about the location of the
major increases and their magnitude. The steadily declining average increments
per annum confirm that this may be a valid ordering of the countries. What is
particularly important is that in this case we can compare the relative magnitude
of the major jumps with the tendency in previous or later decades. As a matter of
fact a ‘gradual’ development should manifest itself not only in the absence of
sudden major increases, but also in an as much as possible constant (even if
minor) increases in each decade. In fact, following the table from top to bottom,
what is more important is not so much the decline in the magnitude of the per
annum increases in the case of major enlargements, but also a generally
increasing level of per annum increases in the other decades not characterised
by any major redefinition of the franchise.
From this point of view the Netherlands clearly looks to be the most clear-
cut Western European case of gradual enlargement. Not only does it present a
case of electoral enfranchisement bigger than 10% of the electorate only in the
final phase after W.W.I, but what is more important in all other decades (but one)
is that the average increase was considerably higher than in the other cases,
indicating a process of really progressive enlargement of the electorate.
Considering that the 3 decades which precede the final granting of universal male
suffrage after W.W.I present a rate of growth of .58, .97 and .64, this means that,
roughly in each of them, the electorate was increased by about 6, 10 and again 6
percent, for a total of 22 percent (see Table 1 and Figure 1 i).
Britain, despite its fame as a very gradual development case, presents two
peaks, and in other decades rates of growth which are near to zero. Another case
worth commenting is Norway. As the Netherlands are often said to ‘approach the
British model’ whilst actually they are the best example of the gradual model, so
Norway is also customarily associated with both the Netherlands and Britain in
the group of the gradual development countries. However, there is little in our
analysis which suggests such an association. The image of gradual development
in Norway is probably due to something which is unique to it. Once universal male
suffrage was achieved in 1900, the following development was indeed particularly
gradual because the enfranchisement of women was granted in several steps
and the electorate gradually passed from 35.2 in 1906 to 58.5, to 60.2, to 77.1
and to finally 80.4 in 1918. However, this graduality concerned exclusively the
enlargement of the female electorate granted in several steps rather than in a
single one as in all other countries except Ireland and Great Britain. As far as the
male suffrage is concerned, Norway was not much dissimilar from Sweden or, for
that matter, from Austria. Gradual development was the characteristic of the pre-
1890 and of the post-1900 period, but in the 1890s the Norwegian electorate
increased by about 20% of the adult population, which is a fundamental break
from a gradual process.
At this stage one is more confident of having grasped the essential
features of the process, without having forced too many national cases into the
comparative framework. I can now provide a comparative classification of the
Western European enfranchisement process along the two dimensions of its
timing and tempo. This classification provided in Table 4 summarises the
argument and the discussion of individual cases made so far. This is as far as
one can go in an attempt to comparatively appreciate the development of the
franchise.
As we have seen, the most difficult case to be classified is the
Netherlands, whose development is unquestionably gradual, but which in terms of
timing finds itself in a relatively late-comer position until the end of the first decade
of the century. We could classify it as gradual and intermediate as well as gradual
and late. I have finally located the Dutch case in the intermediate timing because
the levels of enfranchisement in the 1890s and 1900s were considerably higher
than those of Italy and Sweden (classified as late-comers).
REVERSALS
A third dimension of suffrage enlargement is the existence or absence of
reversals: that is, the more or less linear nature of the enlargement itself. I have
felt it unnecessary to explicitly introduce this dimension as a classification
dimension because in most cases the development of the electorate was a fairly
linear process. In only a few cases can one speak of important reversals. France
is the classic historical case for which the label of ‘early, sudden and followed by
reversal’ category was originally forged. However reversals existed with respect
to the high promises of revolutionary times and of 1793. Since 1815 France kept
a  very restricted franchise and came back to universal male suffrage in 1848, still
in time to have at that time the largest franchise in the whole of Europe. It is
unfair, therefore, to concentrate attention on the Restoration reversal vis-à-vis
revolutionary times when the outstanding basic characteristic of the French
pattern remains a very early attainment of universal male suffrage. It is true that
after 1848 a revision of the electoral lists (the law of 31st May 1850) meant to
restrict the franchise, demanding as a prerequisite three years of residence in the
voting place. However this reform, that has often been described as a deliberate
anti-working class mass disenfranchisement, had only minor effects: the
electorate passed from 9.837.000 in 1849 to 9.836.000 in 1852 to 9.490.00 in
1857, to rise again aver the 10 million mark in 1963. Therefore, at most the
reform reduced the electorate of less than 340.000 electors, that is about 3
percent on the occasion of a single election -hardly mass disenfranchisement.
The entire rest of the electoral history of France remained under the rule of the
male universal franchise without reversals of any sort.
In Denmark, the original very democratic promises of the 1848 revolution
were somehow muted in the following decade. Confrontation between the King
and the conservatives, with their strongholds in the First Chamber, on one side,
and the rural-supported liberals in the second chamber on the other, resulted in a
minor de-democratisation of the constitution itself. In 1866 suffrage was also
restricted, but such changes had their impact felt particularly in the Landsthing
(the first chamber) where higher property qualifications were introduced.
However, from the strict point of view of the suffrage, these conflicts manifested
themselves more in the stagnation of a relatively high but not yet universal male
suffrage throughout the 1850s and 1860s. No real sign of significant
disenfranchisement are evident in the post-1849 figures reported in Table 1. On
the whole, in these two cases, reversal was less important than usually imagined
and with respect to our purpose it occurred in a very early phase much before
mass parties had organised.
The only case of a franchise reversal which has significant implication for
our analysis is Italy in the 1890s. The revision of the electoral registers carried
over in 1894 reduced the electorate from 2.934.000 in 1892 to 2.121.000 in 1895:
that is, a reduction of slightly more than 800.000 electors. Almost a third of the
electorate of 1892 lost its right to vote in 1895. Moreover in this case, it is
unquestionable that the disenfranchisement was deliberately directed against the
socialist movement. The latter had founded its first unified national party the year
before and the franchise revision was only one of a set of measures set up by the
government in a clear anti-socialist operation. Thirdly the disenfranchisement
lasted. It was a clear break of the process of growth initiated by the reform law of
1882 and it took 17 years and 5 elections before, in 1909, the electorate came
back to the same quantitative level as 1892. This decision was indeed of great
political momentum because, if Italy had not stopped its franchise development in
1894 it could have exhibited a very gradual pattern, rather than being
characterised as a sudden and late development case. So in the Italian case, we
find a disenfranchisement that combines big magnitude, lasting influence and
clear anti-socialist political orientation. The Italian case seems to me the only
important disenfranchisement policy directly linked and relevant for the history of
mass party formation and regime consolidation.
EQUALITY
Timing and tempo do not exhaust the dimensions of variation of the
enfranchisement process which are important for our analytical goal. A second
important aspect to be analysed in the perspective of a comparative evaluation of
electoral development concerns the fairness of representation mechanisms. The
inequality we are dealing with in this section is not the inequality resulting from
representation mechanisms -that is, in the mechanisms of transformation of votes
into seats- but the simple inequality of the vote; that is, the violation of the
principle of one person one vote. Even after suffrage was granted, a number of
other obstacles made it difficult to translate vote rights into actual representation.
High levels of inequalities in the vote drastically influenced the potential support
for outsiders parties, and also shaped their attitudes and reactions to the political
system.
It is interesting to wonder whether, from the point of view of an outsider
movement, the restriction of an equal suffrage was more acceptable than the
inequality of an enlarged suffrage. Up to the turning point of the First World War,
attitudes toward the electoral channel were still very ambivalent in most European
dominant circles. As mentioned before, the suffrage had a double function in their
mind. One was the legitimation of the ruling political elites and in this perspective
the suffrage, even if limited, was an instrument of inter-elite recruitment and
competition. as the main tool for the selection of the ruling political elites. The
second was the political integration of social groups to the nation state. In the
second case, the major goal of the electoral process was to offer a symbolic
participation right without this making an impact on the selection and recruitment
of the ruling elite, which, through various devices, continued to be coopted and
selected from dominant social and bureaucratic groups and to be sheltered by
electoral pressures from below. In this perspective a large franchise was granted
-indeed the integration purposely required it to be as large as possible- but
diverting mechanisms were devised or kept in place to ensure that such suffrage
had a limited impact on the political equilibrium.
These representational obstacles may have been even more important
than suffrage restrictions in institutional integration terms because the arguments
waged in their support were likely to arouse a deep and strongly felt ‘sense of
injustice’ among those who were affected by them. In defending the class
weighted voting system in Prussia a Minister argued that classes of people had to
vote on the basis ‘of their actual importance in the life of the state’17. This type of
argument made clear the lesser importance of certain people and may have
created more resentment than sheer exclusion on capacity (cultural and/or
economic) grounds. An unequal vote ‘offered’ to ‘lower’, ‘marginal’ or ‘dangerous’
groups institutionalised inequalities more evidently and more unacceptably than
wide restrictions of the right to vote itself.
These representational obstacles were made up by devices which
increased for newcomers and outsiders either the cost of votes or the cost of
seats; in many cases they were combined. Mechanisms persisted throughout the
19th century which impeded or hampered the ‘one person one vote’ principle:
plural voting and curia/ estate voting. Other devices introduced strong
elements of distortion in the free and direct expression of the voter’s choice:
indirect voting and open (non-secret) voting18.
OPEN VOTING
Oral voting and shows of hands greatly facilitated pressures and
manipulations by government officials and local elites alike, particularly in non-
urban settings. During the 19th century they were slowly abolished everywhere.
In France this occurred as early as in 1831, but the practice of non-secrecy
remained for a very long period quite widespread and the ‘secrecy of the ballot
was not particularly well preserved until 1914, when voting ballot and envelopes
to cover the ballot were instituted’19. Germany and the Netherlands introduced
provisions for preserving the secrecy at the end of the 1840s; Italy in 1861, but
testimonies of governmental officials’ pressures in the direction of manifesting
one’s preferences in the countryside of southern Italy were denounced up to the
beginning of the 20th century20. A new wave of ballot secrecy provisions
occurred between the end of the 1860s and the beginning of the 1870s with
measures in Sweden, Belgium, Switzerland (at the federal level) United Kingdom
(and Ireland). Norway did the same in 1885 and the latecomers were Denmark21,
Austria and Finland which introduced explicit norms to protect secrecy only at the
beginning of the 20th century.
INDIRECT VOTING
Indirect voting meant that the ballot was cast not for legislative candidates,
but for ‘grand electors’, who, in turn, selected representatives to parliament. This
double step introduced an additional barrier for young movements and for parties
that could not rely on established and visible social elites, particularly at the local
level. It was conceived as a filter against ‘dangerous’ candidates. The system was
more widespread than is usually thought. France, the Netherlands and
Switzerland had used indirect voting in the early part of the 19th century, in the
periods respectively from 1815-1817 (France), 1815-1831 (Netherlands), and
1815-1848 (Switzerland) and once abandoned they never resorted again to it. On
the contrary, Austria, Finland, Norway, and Sweden kept some form of indirect
voting well in to the 20th century. In Austria, voting was indirect from 1861 until
1901 in the IV curia and, since 1897 also in the V curia, so that the bulk of the
enfranchised electorate was subject to it. In Finland the vote was indirect until
1906 for the estate of peasants, which obviously constituted the overwhelming
majority of the adult population. Norway and Sweden kept indirect voting until
1906 and 1908 respectively, even if in Sweden from 1866 to 1908 the vote was
only partly indirect. It is important to note that in Austria, Finland, Sweden and
Norway indirect voting may be the key to the explanation of the very late entering
into parliament of the first socialist representatives. In Sweden, socialists obtained
seats in 1902, 13 years and several elections after their final national
centralisation. In Norway seats were obtained only in 1903, after 17 years of
extra-parliamentary life. In Finland the difference is lower (8 years) because the
party was centralising late anyway (1899). In Austria also, effective parliamentary
entry was delayed up to the beginning of the 19th century, even if the party was
quite well organised nationally since 1889. However, in the latter two cases one
should add to the indirect voting techniques the curia system which obviously did
not help either. One should probably add that indirect voting was not adopted in
Imperial elections in Germany, but was retained in Prussia up to 1918, and
Prussia had an overwhelming importance for the Reich politics22.
CURIA AND ESTATE SYSTEMS
Curia and estate system assigned disproportionate numbers of seats to
the upper estates, generally representing aristocratic and wealthy families, and
the clergy, while formally giving the right to vote to everybody or to a fraction of
each major social group. Such systems were retained in 19th century Western
Europe in four counties. Sweden gave it up with the reform of 1866. Prussia kept
it until the collapse of the Empire; Austria and Finland abandoned it only at the
beginning of the 20th century, respectively in 1907 and 1906. In Austria, from the
first direct election of the lower House in 1873 to the electoral reform of 1907, the
system was based on 4 curia of electors. However, between 1873 and 1897 the
members of the fourth curia (24 year-old male inhabitants of rural communes who
paid minimum direct taxes) voted indirectly (and very often orally). Each
commune had to elect a secondary elector for every 500 inhabitants. Secondary
electors were then inscribed on the electoral lists for the elections of the deputies.
When the electoral reform of 14 June 1896 added a fifth Curia, its principle was
universal and equal. In it were included male citizens over 24. However, even in
this case voting was indirect and in addition to that, the electors of the first four
curia were given an additional second vote in the fifth curia. Therefore, in Austria
the entire period between 1873 until the reform of 1907 was characterised by
unequal and indirect suffrage for important groups and categories.
The Finnish and Swedish systems were very similar. In Finland, since
when the Diet had started to meet again with some regularity in 1869 to the 1904-
1907 reform, the system was based on the 4 curia of nobility, clergy, towns
(burgesses) and peasants. The four estates were organised as following. The first
estate offered direct representation to male heads of noble families; the clergy
estate offered direct representation to the higher ranking clergy and included
elected representatives of lower ranking clergy; the burgher estate was
composed of representatives elected by burghers meeting professional and
income qualifications; the peasant estate was elected by independent farmers,
with the exclusion of tenants and agricultural labourers. Moreover, other complex
aspects increased the inequality. For instance, elections were direct to the estate
of burgesses, but plural voting was granted to electors as a function of local taxes
paid. In the estate of peasants, no plural voting was foreseen, but elections were
indirect. One should also add that no provisions for secrecy were specifically
envisaged. This infernal mechanism yielded four houses formally endowed with
the same powers in which, in 1900, about 150 noble families had the same
weight as the 1,083 enfranchised clerics, the 23,469 eligible burghers
(representing all those living in an urban context) and the 10,184 enfranchised
peasants (representing the whole rural population)23.
PLURAL VOTING
Finally, throughout the 19th century in Europe the practice of plural voting
remained in vigour, that is, the attribution of extra votes to the wealthy and/or well
educated citizens or to representatives of special institutions (churches,
universities, etc.). Even this system had the direct effect of bureaucratically
separating citizens into voting categories based on class criteria, and of
overweighting the upper classes. Three countries stand out for their important
and prolonged practice of plural voting: Austria, Finland and Belgium.
The Finnish continued to use plural voting based on professional and
income qualification in the estate of burghers up to 1906. Belgium and Austria are
the cases where plural voting played a much more important role also because,
rather than being a remnant of past tradition gradually being reduced, it was
clearly introduced or made wider in view of checking democratisation tendencies
and it therefore acquired a clear political meaning against newcomers. In Austria
plural voting was relatively minor up to 1897, but it was made a large scale
phenomenon in the context of a democratisation of the franchise. When an
additional fifth curia was added in 1897 introducing universal and equal suffrage
for male citizens over 24 years, the electors of the first four curiae all gained a
second vote. Between 1896 and 1907, therefore about 40% of the Austrian males
cast two votes.
Even more clear is the political meaning of the introduction of plural voting
in Belgium in 1894. In this case, inequalities were even more accentuated and
their introduction was indeed a deliberate act to counterbalance the increase of
the electorate. In fact, between 1831 and 1892, for almost 60 years the suffrage
had been very restricted in Belgium, but equal. This long tradition of equality in
the vote was broken on the occasion of the 1894 electoral reform which
introduced universal male suffrage. The package deal counterbalanced this
sudden and quantitatively remarkable increase of the electorate with particularly
accentuated plural voting procedures: one additional vote was granted to married
male citizens older than 35; widows paying more than 5 Fr of taxes and citizens
older than 25; owners of real estate above a certain value; two additional votes
were granted to citizens having a title of higher or middle level education or
having held or holding a public office requiring such a level of education.
Combining the two qualifications, one could get to a maximum of three extra
votes. The final result was a high level of inequality which lasted until 191924.
According to Stengers, there were in 1899-1900 901,000 electors with 1 vote;
313,000 electors with 2 votes (making up, therefore, for 626,000 votes) and
237,000 electors with 3 votes (711,000 votes)25. The half a million citizens with
more than one vote largely outweighed electorally the 900,000 with a single vote.
These heavy inequalities, and the obvious exchange which existed between
enlargement of suffrage and its being made unequal in the Belgian case, could
have made for a very radical response of the Belgian socialist movement.
Actually, the early history of the Belgian socialist movement was largely
dominated by huge fights and confrontation concerning the equalisation of voting
rights. However such a system, once combined with the majority plurinominal
double-ballot and with a high territorial concentration of the socialist vote, did not
penalise socialist parliamentary representation very much and therefore was not
profoundly disliked by the socialist themselves.
In the United Kingdom and Ireland plural voting remained in vigour well
into the 20th century and actually Britain only eliminated it altogether in 1948. In
the United Kingdom between 1832 and 1880, plural voting existed when the
economic requirements criteria were met by the same citizen in different
constituencies (counties and boroughs) and extra seats were reserved for the
election by university graduates. By 1885 plural voting continued only for
university and business reserved sets; in 1924 this plural voting was restricted to
a maximum of two votes and in 1938 university seats and all plural voting were
abolished. The Irish situation was the same until 1918, when, however, plural
voting was still maintained for university graduates and occupiers of business
premises (maximum two votes) and was definitely abolished in 1923. In these
latter two cases the weight of the extra voting was never overwhelming and by
the 1880s inequalities had become minor. In Britain in 1911, about 7% of the
electorate cast plural votes as a result of their meeting more than one franchise
requirement or meeting property requirement in more than one constituency.
Although in extreme cases one could go in theory up to 20 votes, the overall
impact by the end of the century was minor.
Among the remaining countries, France had resorted to plural voting only
in the 1820s and for a very few highly restricted franchise elections. The Swedish
eliminated plural voting in the 1866 reform. No manifest plural voting inequalities
existed in the cases of Denmark, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, the Netherlands
and Norway, which in their electoral development always kept to the principle of
equal vote.
In Table 5 I have synthesised the major representation inequalities so far
discussed by country. I have also added a column indicating whether an
important occasion of deliberately disenfranchising elections occurred and when,
which indicates that the only important case is the Italian electoral reform of 1894
which immediately followed the formation of a socialist party. I have also added a
column indicating the final introduction of proportional representation, which
represents in most cases the final step in equalisation of voting right. The
exception is Belgium, where PR was introduced very early while the plural voting
system was retained. It is difficult to reconcile into a single dimension such a wide
array of devices and different situations. We can however say that obstacles to
fair representation were several, important and protracted in Austria and Finland;
relatively minor and gradually removed in Britain and Ireland; many but also
removed early in Sweden (much before the socialist movement appeared on the
scene); limited to one device but protracted in Norway (indirect voting) and
Belgium (plural voting); fundamentally absent by the time modern parties
emerged in Denmark, France, Germany (but with the important exception of the
Prussian state), Italy, the Netherlands and Switzerland.
PARTICIPATION
Participation is the last dimension of analysis of the process of
enfranchisement. Strictly speaking, it is clear that electoral participation has no
direct relation with enfranchisement itself. However, in dealing with historical data
that go back to the middle of the 19th century, it is necessary to wonder whether
during the process of enlargement of the legal right to vote actual and systematic
phenomena linked to the actual utilisation of this right manifested themselves.
The turnout indicates the extent to which, for every given level of legal electorate
the right to vote was actually transformed into actual votes, and this propensity
varied remarkably over time and across countries in the phase of mass
enfranchisement. Therefore, comparing turnout levels through time and countries
may clarify the different propensities to participate of national enfranchise
electorates.
Even in this case our interest concentrates mostly on the phase up to
W.W.II, after which levels of turnout, as well as levels of electorate, tend to
homogenise to a large extent. What we are interested in are not so much short
term fluctuations in turnout from one election to the next, but rather systematic
cross-time and space differences in levels of electoral participation and their
relationship to the process of enfranchisement.
The first aspect worth investigating is the extent to which the development
over time of the turnout tends to present the same elements of linearity as the
development of the electorate. If we correlate the two indicators the relationship is
weak as one would expect. After all, turnout is the total votes as a percentage of
the electorate and should vary independently of the level of the electorate itself.
However, if there was a tendency for turnout to grow over time in parallel to the
growth of the electorate, this should result in a positive correlation coefficient.
Looking at the figures in Table 6, the relationship is almost non-existent. We can
only note that it tends to be slightly negative in the period before 1880 and in the
period between the two wars, whilst in the period 1881-1917 and in that after
W.W.II, it is positive. We could obviously venture a first tentative interpretation
which is suggested by this distribution. In the context of the period 1831-1880,
which was a period of fairly constant electorate size, the association is non-
existant, while in the following phase which is the only one of more rapid growth
in male franchise, it tended to become slightly positive. The Inter-wars period is
characterised mainly by female enfranchisement in most countries and this
enfranchisement do not seem to produce a corresponding increase of turnout. On
the contrary, the final phase of fully enfranchised electorates reproduces at even
higher levels the positive association between the two.
These data, however, raise some doubts about a fairly general thesis that
links the over time development of the franchise and of turnout. It is often argued
that in the context of restricted franchise on the basis of census or capacity
requirements, the turnout should be high as it is the expression of the elevated
propensity of the richest and most educated strata of the population to participate
electorally. Successive enlargements of the franchise, resulting in the granting of
the right to vote to citizens of lower socio-economic and cultural status, should
result in a lowering of the turnout. This should be particularly true in the cases of
big and sudden increases of the electorate and, we may add, in the cases of
enfranchisement of women. Their sudden involvement in political roles
traditionally associated and reserved for males should produce an accentuated
fall in the turnout levels.
These data over a large historical period do not offer much support to this
developmental interpretation. To support the hypothesis, one should find different
signs for the associations of the 1831-1880 and 1880-1917 periods. It is therefore
necessary to have a closer look at to the historical development of turnout. In
Table 7the data concerning the 442 elections between 1831 and 1980, for which
it was possible to obtain information concerning the electorate and the turnout,
have been arranged by mean level of turnout by decade. The reader will be
alerted that before 1870-1880, the data are by far less representative because of
some countries which are missing and of others which have very few elections
(see Table 1 for a list of elections considered, even if in some cases turnout was
not available). Yet, even without being fully representative these data offer a
picture of how the turnout levels have developed since the 1830s.
These figures offer only modest evidence of a curvilinear historical effect of
franchise development over turnout levels. The mean turnout levels during the
phase of very restricted suffrage are not higher than those in the period of
suffrage enlargements. Moreover, since the 1850s the mean level of turnout has
not stopped growing. Surely turnout levels were higher in elections during the
1830s and 1840s than in those of the 1850s and 1860s. This, however, can
hardly be considered as supporting evidence for the thesis given that the suffrage
was not much wider in the latter as compared with the former. It looks as if
turnout has a long term development similar to that of the electorate itself. This I
think becomes even more evident when we look at the mean level of turnout not
by decade, but directly by the level of enfranchised electorate. In Table 8 this is
achieved by rank-ordering all elections into five categories according to the level
of enfranchised electorate. In no way do restricted electorates show higher
turnout levels than wider ones. The only fall in turnout is in the category of the
electorates ranging from 60 to 80% of the adult population: from 75.4 to 64.8%, to
rise again in the last category to 81.6 percentage. This fall may be interpreted
tentatively as the result of the female enfranchisement. Electorates of the 60-80
percent levels were probably electorates which had not totally enfranchised the
female, or alternatively totally enfranchised electorates but with a very high voting
age (for instance as in Denmark - 30 years))26. We may think that early female
voting produced a decline in turnout.
In conclusion, there is no evidence to sustain the existence of a long term
curvilinear development of the turnout. If anything, it seem that at the European
average level the turnout has experienced a long term structural growth parallel to
that of the franchise. Yet, the generally linear association over time between the
electorate and turnout which is predominant at the overall election level and
which is represented in the regression line of Figure 2, may be the aggregate
result of national patterns which are more supportive of the curvilinear thesis,
according to which early restricted electorates should have a higher turnout than
rapidly growing ones. In Figure 2 each country is plotted with different symbols so
that a preliminary control for country pattern can be performed.
In all cases except one, the plotting of the electorate and turnout levels
suggest no curvilinear type relationship. Only in Norway this is the case. Figure 3
reproduces the Norwegian pattern. In it, the bulk of the early pre-partisan
elections show low levels of electorate and low levels of turnout. With the
beginning of partisan politics in the 1880s, the restricted electorate was politicised
and showed high levels of turnout. These dropped with the increase of the
electorate to regain previous levels only in the 1930s. The fact that Rokkan gave
a great deal of attention and publicity to this peculiar Norwegian pattern has
probably helped to make it something more than a specific national pattern. But
there is, however, no evidence of it being so.
Let us however control the validity of the general thesis that is behind the
previous argument: i.e. that major enlargements of the suffrage are accompanied
by a fall in turnout. This could be true for major enlargements even if it does not
result in an overall curvilinear historical development of turnout levels. I have
controlled for each major (greater than 10%) increase in the electorate, the
corresponding variation in the turnout level for the same election and the following
ones when useful. In Table 9 the results of this exercise are reported, separating
the major increases in the electorate resulting from exclusively male
enlargements from those which concerned men as well as in part women, and
finally from those which concerned only female enfranchisement.
Unfortunately, for some of the cases of major increases of the
enfranchised population, the turnout differential is not available. However, the
evidence in Table 9 is enough to conclude that no general or even statistically
predominant tendency to the fall of turnout in the case of major enlargements of
the franchise can be safely ascertained. Paradoxically, the most supportive
instance of the three listed in Table 9 is that of male enfranchisement. If we
consider that the Belgian 1894 and the Dutch 1918 enfranchisement were
associated with important increases of the turnout because in those elections
compulsory voting was introduced, we are left with three case of turnout decline
(Sweden 1911, Norway 1900 and Italy 1913) and two of turnout stability and even
growth (the Netherlands in 1897 is striking: +16.7% in turnout; France 1848 is a
stable turnout, but there is a dramatic drop in the following 1849 election.
In the enlargements which include a part of the male and a part of the
female electorate (second three columns) the cases of turnout fall are still slightly
prevalent (they all occurred between 1907 and 1918). The most significant,
however, is the only British drop of 14.6%, while the others are minor changes.
Finally, and most surprising, no general support to the thesis is offered by the
female enlargements which produce an equal distribution of increases and drops
in turnout. In a nutshell it is hard to interpret these data in view of a general or
predominant tendency, and national contextual aspects seem to dominate and be
responsible for individual outcomes. The only two countries where increases in
electorate invariably result into fall in turnout are Sweden and particularly Norway.
So far, we have excluded the existence of a temporal curvilinear
relationship between electorate and turnout, arguing that the two tend to grow
together at the general overall set of elections levels. We have also concluded
that no sufficient evidence exists to confirm that major enfranchisement resulted
in falling turnout levels. The last point worth investigating is whether individual
countries were characterised during the process of mass politics development by
systematically higher or lower levels of electoral participation: that is, to pass from
the overall characterisation of the process to its variation among country. The
period in question is the period up to the 1920s. A first and most direct
appreciation of the different levels of turnout in the European countries can be
obtained by looking at the Figures 1 a-o located in the Appendix of this chapter. In
them, the dotted lines indicate the turnout.
A close scrutiny of these graphs shows a great variety of different national
patterns. For instance, Belgium -and Austria since the data on turnout have been
available (1919)- is the prototype of the high turnout country irrespective of the
level of the electorate. Turnout in this case can be considered to be not a very
important source of variation. France and the Netherlands are similar cases of
relatively high and stable turnout. In all these cases the level of the electorate
does not seem to influence in an important way the level of turnout which is
always comparatively high. The United Kingdom and Finland have a medium
turnout in this period, between 60 and 70%, and it oscillates around these figures
irrespective of electorate development in the UK (in Finland the electorate is very
large). Denmark and Germany constitute a different case. The turnout grows
steadily over time irrespective of the trend in the electorate. In these two cases,
but more clearly in the Danish, it seems that electoral mobilisation takes place
mostly through the progressive involvement of enfranchised people, and this
increase tends to be gradual over time without being profoundly affected by
changes or stability in the electorate. Of Norway we have already spoken. Finally
Sweden, Italy and Switzerland are the cases in which throughout the entire period
the turnout is systematically low. In Italy it remains stable below 50 and 60% until
after W.W.I. In Sweden it grows over time, but (see Fig. 1 m) its starting level was
so low (only 20% in 1872) that at the beginning of the century still less than half of
the already highly restricted electorate voted. Switzerland has a stable, secular
low level of turnout with the exclusion of the ‘jump’ which occurred in the 20 years
between 1919 and 1939. These significant differences in the average level of
turnout in the crucial phase of mass enfranchisement and party formation are
synthesised in Figure 4, which reproduce the decade mean levels of turnout and
electorate for the decades between 1880 and 1920.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper was meant to chart the European variation in enfranchisement
process. The starting point of the exercise was that the straight-forward
characterisations which abound in the literature and which take the lead from a
few exemplary cases (a typical example is the opposition of France and Britain)
are unsatisfactory. The enfranchisement process was analysed comparatively
across four main dimensions: the timing and the tempo of the development of
formal rights of voting; the inequalities of these rights, and the actual level of
electoral participation that at each historical moment characterised the
enfranchised electorates. Special attention was devoted to the relationship which
exists between the level of the electorate and the level of turnout, discussing in
particular the thesis which argues that the early enlargement of suffrage was
accompanied by declining turnout.
Table 10 below summarises in a simple way the experiences of all the
countries. I have forced them into three classes separating the extremes (early,
sudden and high versus late, gradual and low) with an intermediate category
which includes all those cases that do not clearly fit into either of them. Although,
as I have shown, there was a great deal of historical variation so that it is difficult
to classify each case for the global period, the values in Table 10 are a synthetic
appreciation of the main features of electoral development in the crucial period
between 1870 and 1920.
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